V. C. Chappell; IV*—Stuff and Things, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 61–76, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

Ontology was never Hume's main interest, but he certainly had opinions as to what there is, and he often expressed these in his philosophical works. Indeed it seems clear that Hume changed his ontological views while writing the Treatise, and that not just one but two different ontologies are to be found there. The ontology of Parts I, II, and III of Book I is more or less Lockean. There are minds and their operations and qualities. There are physical entities, (...) bodily actions and qualities if not bodies over and above these. And there are further entities, called ideas by Locke and perceptions by Hume, that represent things other than themselves, both physical and mental, while existing in and being dependent upon minds. In Part IV of Book I, however, and especially in Sections 2 and 6, a new ontology appears, one that differs not only from the doctrine of the earlier sections of the Treatise but also from any that previous philosophers had held. According to this new ontology, there are only perceptions: all other sorts of things are absorbed by or reduced to these, or else simply eliminated. Berkeley had indeed assimilated bodies and the properties of bodies to perceptions, but he had kept minds as a distinct category of entity. Hume went the whole way, making everything perceptions. We might characterise this new ontology as trans-Berkeleyan, or call it, on account of its similarity to later doctrines so named, phenomenalism or neutral monism. (shrink)

I do not think it would be fair for me to reply to Professor Spiegelberg’s rejoinder without giving him the chance to reply in turn to my reply. The first speaker in a symposium should always, I believe, have the last word. But by that principle I am entitled to a reply to Professor Chisholm, for whom, in his original paper, I was a primary target.

The Essay concerning Human Understanding was published at the end of 1689.1 It sold well, and within three years Locke was planning revisions for a second edition. Among those whose “advice and assistance” he sought was the Irish scientist William Molyneux. Locke had begun a correspondence with Molyneux a few months before, after the latter had lavishly praised the Essay and its author in the Epistle Dedicatory of his own Dioptrica Nova, published early in 1692. Here was a man, Locke (...) concluded, whose judgment one could trust. He returned Molyneux’s compliment in the Essay’s new edition, calling him “that very Ingenious and Studious promoter of real Knowledge, ... whom I am proud to call my friend”. (shrink)

Attention has been drawn, particularly since Kant, to propositions which can not have negative instances. They used to be called a priori, axioms, first principles. Today, they are usually called postulates—C. I. Lewis uses both the old and new terminology—because there is a growing recognition of the fact that at least some of them are not “necessary” in the traditional sense. Kant placed a limitation on the apriorism of the continental rationalists. Current epistemologists and logicians have outstripped Kant in the (...) direction signalled by him. Both he and they, however, concur in the opinion that apriori propositions are subject to negation of a sort. The Kantian dinge-an-sich, though they can not contradict these propositions by being negative instances of them, do nevertheless stand to them in the relation of insubordination, thereby exerting on them a “negative action” of a sort. And, according to current views, there are instances which, though they fall outside the range of significance of a proposition or system and hence can not contradict it, do nevertheless tend to bring about a revision of it by a negative action of some sort. The purpose of this brief essay is to coin a convenient name for such instances and to describe certain properties of their peculiar negative action. (shrink)

A compact edition of Mr. Beck's excellent translation of the second Critique, slightly revised, together with a helpful short introduction and a bibliography.--V. C. C.

Eight short papers, semi-popular in intent, surveying British philosophy from Bradley, through Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, to the contemporary analysis of Ryle and Austin. Coverage is spotty, and some of the treatments are so brief and sketchy as to be of dubious value. Ryle's introduction, however, and concluding papers by Strawson and Warnock are both pleasant and instructive.--V. C. C.

A new edition of a famous classic, printed with elegance and taste. Mr. Shields' introduction succinctly reviews Mill's life and work, outlines the essay, and points up some of its problems.--V. C. C.

An attempt to deal with "the fundamental philosophical problem of the Absolute" in an original way. Absolute Being is interpreted as "the act of total existence," and is taken to include all that is or can be, as well as what "exists" negatively or is not.--V. C. C.

The essays which comprise this book represent a series of earnest attempts to understand the nature of metaphysical utterances, and to account for their "abiding fascination" for the human intellect. Arguing on the basis of the familiar distinction of the logical empiricists, the author maintains that metaphysical statements are neither empirical nor a priori; but neither are they, thereby, merely verbal or utterly nonsensical, as the older positivism held. They are, rather, "linguistic innovations," made for the ultimate purpose of satisfying (...) some unconscious need or desire. Metaphysical sentences actually denote "the unconscious contents of our minds," and the metaphysician's belief that he is announcing a theory about the world or reality is strictly an illusion, "produced by altering [at a pre-conscious level] the use of a word or expression." Professor Lazerowitz is somewhat limited in his understanding of metaphysics by his positivistic assumptions. Most metaphysicians would claim that they assert necessary propositions saying something about the real--including the empirical--world. Failure to recognize even the possibility of such propositions makes much of Professor Lazerowitz's account seem irrelevant to what practicing metaphysicians themselves understand of their task.--V. C. C. (shrink)

An English version of a work which has attracted wide attention since its publication in France some 15 years ago. It represents an effort to face and to resolve a problem implicit in much so-called "existential" thinking and writing, the problem of suicide: does not the existential recognition of the absurdity of life compel one to leave it? M. Camus' argument is often hard to follow, but his answer is plain: suicide is not justified, even though absurdity is inevitable; the (...) proper response to absurdity, indeed, is just the affirmation of life. We must, like Sisyphus, continue to struggle, even though the struggle nought availeth; "One must," concludes M. Camus, "imagine Sisyphus happy." The five short pieces which accompany the title essay in this volume include some examples of what M. Camus probably does best--intense evocations of the North African landscape and mood.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Marx's extended reply to Prudon's Philosophy of Poverty. The translation is based on the first edition of 1847, but embodies the corrections made by Engels for the German editions of 1885 and 1892. Engels' two prefaces, together with other material relevant to the book's occasion and content, are also included.--V. C. C.

An exact reprint of the last corrected edition of the standard English translation of Descartes' Philosophical Works, long out of print. The Dover Press is to be commended for again making available, in compact and inexpensive form, this famous edition, indispensable to the English reader of Descartes.--V. C. C.

An attempt to present Kant's Critical Philosophy in a non-technical and up-to-date manner. The author is largely successful in translating complex doctrines into simple language and in relating Kant's thought to contemporary developments in philosophy, science, morals and theology. He stresses the continuity of Kant's thinking with our own, and expounds the Kantian position in the light of the criticisms which have been directed against it, in our and other times. Despite the simplicity of its language, however, the book is (...) not always as clear in meaning or content as one might wish, and some of the interpretations--as when, in Chapter 2, space and time are made out to be "particulars"--are decidedly strange.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Maritain's Walgreen Foundation Lectures on political philosophy, given in 1949, in a handsomely produced paperbound edition.--V. C. C.

An original and independent treatment of epistemology's central question--that concerning the relation between the mind and its objects. The author's answer is that of naive realism: the mind is a spectator of its objects, and the objects themselves are real and independent of it and its activity. The classical objections to such a view are examined forthrightly and yet with care; error, e.g., appears as a function of the unclarity with which some objects are apprehended rather than as evidence that (...) all objects are fictions. Professor Earle is quite willing to spell out the somewhat startling ontological consequences of his view; since whatever is an object of consciousness is real and independent, illusions differ from, say, material objects, not as non-being differs from being, but as one kind of being differs from another. The result is a contribution to metaphysics as well as to epistemology, and its conclusions in both areas are fresh and important. Part of Chapter I first appeared in this Review, VIII, 211-24.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Jowett's Protagoras has been revised extensively for this new edition, and helpful section titles have been provided. The editor's fifty-page introduction could stand alone; it is a solid and scholarly examination, with footnotes, cross-references, and logical analyses, of the great Socrates-Protagoras quarrel.--V. C. C.

An account, systematically presented, of Plato's views on the subjects covered in the author's earlier books-ethics, aesthetics and philosophy of education--with only passing mention of Platonic logic, epistemology and metaphysics. The Platonic views are set against the views of Plato's Greek predecessors, and a final chapter discusses "Plato and Modern Philosophy." Mr. Lodge writes engagingly, but somewhat informally too; his book is intended more as an essay in appreciation than as a work of philosophical interpretation.--V. C. C.

This well designed anthology is a paperback, but not a reprint. Often sizable chunks from the works of nine writers and philosophers are included, and Mr. Kaufmann ties them all together in a series of pithy prefaces. Some of the selections are well known; others--e.g., Jaspers' "On My Philosophy" --appear here for the first time in English, in translations by the editor and others. Mr. Kaufmann's lively introduction attempts to characterize existentialism as a whole, and to place its various representatives (...) in relation to each other; it does both nicely. The volume as a whole, in fact, is a first-rate introduction to existentialism.--V. C. C. (shrink)

A welcome addition to the series of translation-commentaries initiated by the late F. M. Cornford. Mr. Bluck's English Phaedo reads smoothly and naturally; it is, like the original, a work of literature as well as of philosophy. The running commentary is clear, well-informed and helpful, being mainly designed to get the reader through the text. More detailed pieces of analysis and interpretation are placed in an Appendix; here Mr. Bluck argues that Plato's Forms are not merely abstract logical universals, but (...) substantial "things," which "cause" the appearances in the material world. He also defends, in opposition to the majority view, the validity of the crucial proof of the soul's indestructibility at 105E ff.--V. C. C. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is purely expository, but within its limits it is perhaps the best account of existentialism yet to appear in English. Its virtues are clarity, balance, accuracy, and an objectivity of tone which is maintained even in the treatment of emotionally charged subject-matter. Mr. Grimsley summarizes the views of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers, and Marcel in separate chapters of fairly extensive scope, mainly through direct exposition of their major works. In a short introduction, and again in (...) a shorter postscript, he attempts to characterize existentialism and the existential attitude as a whole; his success makes one wish he had done more in this direction.--V. C. C. (shrink)